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FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND THE
BANK LENDING CHANNEL IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF INDONESIA *)

Juda Agung**)

The dominant role of commercial banks as a source of finance and the considerable asymmetry of
information in financial markets in developing countries have raised an argument that the bank lending
channel of monetary transmission mechanism would be very important in such countries. This study
addresses the issue by investigating empirically whether there are differential effects of monetary policy
on banks’ balance sheets, and its implications to the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary
policy in Indonesia, especially since the early 1980s when the government adopted a policy of financial
deveculation. We find significant differences of balance sheet behavior across bank clashes in response
to a change in monetary policy, consistent with the predictions of the bank lending view. We also found
that because of access to foreign funds and the existence of bank loan commitment, the monetary policy
was unable to constrain loan supply by the large (state) banks, indicating that the bank lending channel
operates through smaller (non-state) banks.

*) This paper has been publised in Asian Economic Journal, September 1998, Vol.12, No.3, pp. 273 - 294
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I. Introduction
or the past ten years, there have been voluminous studies on the so-called ‘bank
lending/credit channel’ of monetary transmission mechanism1. These studies
have been motivated by the growing literature on as ymmetric information in
Financial markets and also by the fact that large fluctuations in the aggregate economy are
often generated from an apparently small shock, a phenomenon conjectured by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) as a result of the existence of the “financial accelerator”.

F

According to this view,2 the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy relates
to both their liabilities and assets. In a monetary contraction, bank reserve decrease and owing
to reserve requirements, bank deposits fall. If the decrease in bank deposits is not offset by
other funds which are not subject to reserve requirements, or decrease in securities, this will
result in a decrease in bank loans. If bank loans fall and bank-dependent borrowers are
dominant in the economy, the monetary policy reduces both investment and economic activity.
Hence, monetary policy not only directly influences the real interest rate but also directly affects
the supply of bank loans. Thus, two necessary conditions for the existence of this channel are:
(1) bank loans and securities must be an imperfect substitute for some borrowers, or some
borrowers are bank-dependent; (2) central bank must constrain the supply of bank loans.
Since asymmetric information seems to be prevalent in the financial markets of the
developing countries,3 some, if not most, classes of borrowers find it difficult to issue securities.
As a result of the predominant role of banks in developing countries and their ability to
overcome the information problem in credit markets, many borrowers are substantially bankdependent.4 This is why Stiglitz (1994) suggest that ‘LDCs must expect that firms within their
economies will have to rely heavily on bank lending, rather than securities markets, as a
source of fund.’ To sum up, the first condition of the bank lending channel is likely to be
satisfied in developing countries.
Nevertheless, as a result of the ongoing process of financial liberalization, which has
altered the structure of financial markets, doubts have been raised about the importance of

1

For a comprehensive survey on this topics, see Hubbard (1995), Ceccheti (1995) and Peek and Rosengren (1995).
Many authors distinguish the ‘credit channel’ into the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel.

2

See Bernanke and Blinder (1998).

3

For example, poor accounting disclosure, lack of credit rating agency.

4

Even in the countries like the US where financial markets has been well established, the number of bank-dependent
borrowers is subtantial (see Himmelberg and Morgan, 1995).
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the bank lending view (Thornton (1994) and Meltzer (1995) among others). The reason for
this is that financial deregulation and innovation have widened the menu of financial options
available to firms, reducing their dependency on bank loans. Although such doubt is based
on the US and other developed countries, some studies suggest that it might also be applicable
to developing countries. A survey of corporate financing in developing countries conducted
by Glenn and Pinto (1994) indicates a shift away from bank loan finance to equity finance at
the margin. Furthermore, a study of the capital structure of Indonesian firms by Ang et al.
(1997) suggest that at least for long maturity finance, the (large) firms prefer new stock issuance
to long-run bank loans.
The second condition for the bank lending channel is questionable on empirical
grounds, that is, whatever monetary policy can significantly influence the supply of bank
loans. In order to limit the ability of banks to extend their loans after monetary contraction,
bank must not easily be able to issue other forms of liabilities to replace lost deposits. Some
argue that the central bank has tended to be less able to completely constrain the banks’
liabilities and thus bank loans since bank can issue instruments which are not subject to the
reserve requirement.5 In the Indonesian case, we can observe that recent developments in
funding for financial intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, have been such as to
reduce their reliance on deposits. Recent developments suggest that the non-deposit sources
of bank finance have increased dramatically in the form of foreign borrowing, international
bonds and commercial papers (Folkerts-Landau et al., 1995). In addition to this, an increase
in the use of loan commitments could reduce the role of the bank lending channel or at least it
could lengthen the monetary policy lags. Overall, the potential effects of financial deregulation
on both firms and banks are a weakening of the bank lending channel.
This study evaluates the second condition of the bank lending channel in developing
countries, using Indonesian data especially after financial deregulation. Following kashyap
and stein (1995), it attempts to investigate the responses of bank balance sheet variables
(deposits, loans and securities) of different classes of banks, i.e., large banks which are
supposed to have access to non-deposit source of finance after a monetary contraction, and
small banks whose balance sheets can easily be constrained by the monetary policy innovation.
This is in line with previous studies conducted as part of continuing efforts to resolve
identification problems in the bank lending channel research agenda (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994; Kashyap and Stein 1995, 1997). Bank categories are differentiated on the basis of their
size and their access to foreign source of funds: state banks,6 private foreign exchange licensed
5 See, for example, Romer and Romer (1990).
6 The state banks are large banks and have access to foreign sources of funds.
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banks and non-foreign exchange banks. This approach is to address the question of whether
monetary restrictions can constrain bank loan supply and whether they have differential
effects on bank balance sheet components across different classes of lenders. Furthermore,
the study investigates the effects of monetary policy on the behavior of investment, working
capital and consumer loans across the bank - size categories. This heterogeneity of the loan
types which could reflect the loan size and type of borrowers (consumer vs non-consumer)
would help to shed light on the existence of the bank lending channel.7
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II discuss the implications of financial
deregulation on bank behavior and changes in the conduct of monetary policy. Chapter III
presents the empirical issues and sources of data. Chapter IV reports on the empirical results
for Indonesia. Finally, conclusions and a future research agenda are presented in Chapter V.

II. Financial Deregulation, Bank Behavior and Monetary Policy.
II.1.

Behavior of Commercial Banks

At least three major financial reforms have influenced the development of commercial
banks in Indonesia:8 (1) the 1983 financial reform that abolished credit and interest-rate
ceilings; (2) the 1988 financial reform package (PAKTO); and (3) the 1991 financial reform to
re-regulate banking sectors by introducing some prudential regulations. Banking activity, as
reflected by total assets of the commercial banks, has increased very rapidly since the launch
of PAKTO in October 1988 when market entry to the sector was liberalized. As shown in
Table 1, the asset side of commercial banks’ balance sheets has been dominated by loans and
foreign assets. The share of loans (including loans in foreign currencies) grew substantially
from 63.4% in 1983 to 82.09% in 1991 as a result of 1983 and 1998 financial deregulation and
has been levelling off after periods of consolidation in banking sectors in response to various
strict prudential regulations. It can also be seen that the share of foreign assets and the liquid
assets in commercial banks’ balance sheets decreased significantly over time. The decline in
the growth of foreign assets resulted from a relatively high return on domestic assets after
removal of the ceiling on domestic interest rates in 1983, while the drop in the share of liquid
assets could be attributable to the substantial reduction in the reserve requirement ratio from
15% to 2% in October 1988.

7 Ideally we should divide borrowers into small and large firms. Such data were not, however, available until March
1994.
8 For thorough survey on Indonesian financial development, see Cole and Slade (1996). McLeod (1994) and Marshall
(1994).
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On the liability side, prior to 1983, source of funds for Indonesian banks were mainly
Rupiah deposits and borrowing from Bank Indonesia through the central bank’s lending
scheme to some priority industries. The removal of credit and interest-rate ceilings spurred
commercial banks to compete for funds. Domestic deposits also became competitive with dollar
deposits which resulted in an increase in saving deposits can also be observe in the commercial
banks’ balance sheets after the authorities launched the 1988 financial deregulation. The
increase in deposits of this type was due partly to differential tax treatments in favor of savings
deposits and partly to the removal of restrictions on saving schemes (Marshall, 1994).
After the ceiling on foreign commercial borrowing by banks was abolished and swap
facilities with the central bank were instituted in 1989, off-shore funds such as foreign
borrowing provided a new source of funds for the commercial banks. This is reflected by a
marked increase in the share of foreign liabilities in the commercial banks’ balance sheets,
from 12.14% in 1988 to 20.88% in 1991. The Indonesian banks, especially large ones, became
very active in raising funds from abroad through commercial bank lending to generate the
funds needed by their clients. Inadequate information makes it difficult for nonbank firms to
raise funds in the international market, except the few large companies owned by
conglomerates and big state enterprises. By contrast, the large commercial banks with foreign
branch are able to offer international lenders credible information and thus are able to access

Table 1
Balance Sheets of Indonesian Commercial Banks
(End of the Year Position)
1983
billion
%
rupiah
Assets:
Liquid assets
Total loans *
Foreign assets
Others
Assets = liabilities
Liabilities:
Domestic deposits:
Bank Indonesia
Foreign liabilities
- FX deposits
- Non-deposits
FX liabilities
Capital
Others

1988
billion
%
rupiah

1991
billion
%
rupiah

1995
billion
%
rupiah

1,569
13,208
4,520
1,535
20,832

7.53
63.4
21.7
7.37
100

1,830
46,340
8,397
6,717
63,284

2.89
73.23
13.27
10.61
100

2,943
125,790
11,072
13,434
153,239

1.92
82.09
7.23
8.77
100

5,140
259,027
17,096
27,355
308,618

1.67
83.93
5.54
8.86
100

9,649
4,264
3,257
2,289

46.32
20.47
15.63
10.99

31,198
10,812
7,683
1,159

49.3
17.08
12.14
1.83

74,871
11,692
31,999
11,935

48.86
7.63
20.88
7.79

171,827
10,395
65,994
26,042

55.68
3.37
21.38
8.44

968
1,630
2,032

4.65
7.82
9.75

6,524
4,464
9,127

10.31
7.05
14.42

20,064
10,166
24,511

13.09
6.63
16

39,952
30,111
30,291

12.95
9.76
9.82

Note: * including loans in foreign currencies
Source: Indonesian Financial statistics, Bank Indonesia (various issues)
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external funds at a lower cost than their borrowers. In addition to direct borrowing from foreign
commercial banks, Indonesian banks have been very active as issuers of bonds and other
debt in international markets, especially since the early 1990s (Folkerts-landau et al., 1995).
The active role of large banks as intermediaries in providing foreign funds was partly
encouraged by the relatively stable exchange rate which allowed banks to take advantage of
the interest differential between domestic and US dollar interest rates.9 This behavior was
evident in the periods of high domestic interest rates in 1991-1992. In this period, the large
foreign-exchange banks, including state banks, turned to foreign sources of non-deposit funds
in response to tight money condition in the domestic economy. The possible implication of
this behavior is that the monetary policy contractions could be offset by this behavior of the
large commercial banks, and this is one subject of the empirical investigation.

II.2. Changes in The Conduct of Monetary Policy
Over the years there have been changes in the implementation of monetary policy. Soon
after the credit ceiling and interest rate control were removed, the central bank adopted interest
targeting to reduce possible interest-rate volatility and the unacceptably high levels of interestrates that is was believed would arise were monetary targeting to be adopted under such
financial liberalization. However, after the speculative pressure on the rupiah in mid-1987,
the policy shifted to protecting the level of international reserves (Sundararajan and Molho,
1988). In the immediate past the policy makers seem to have turned towards the use of more
electric targets (Boediono, 1994).
To conduct day-to-day monetary control operations, after removing direct monetary
control through credit and interest ceilings, Bank Indonesia introduced new money market
instruments; SBI (Bank Indonesia Certificates) and SPBU (Money Markets securities, issued
or endorsed by banks). SBIs are issued when the central bank wants to squeeze liquidity,
while SPBUs will be purchased by the central bank in order to increase the liquidity of the
system. These instruments are needed to conduct indirect monetary operations since the
government does not issue Treasury bills used in many countries as the basis of open market
operations and repo policies. Besides as instruments of open market operation, the SBIs can
be used to manage the sort-term liquidity of banks, firms and individuals.
Moreover, sometimes SBIs have been used as an alternative investment. When SBIs

9 This low risk tempted domestic borrowers not to hedge their foreign borrowings as was the problem under the
recent currency turmoil.
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were introduced the auction of the instruments was conducted by a ’cut-off rate’ (COR) system;
wherein Bank Indonesia sets the COR-SBI rates (prices) and the market determines the quantity
of SBIs traded. However, since June 1993, in order to keep SBI rates reflecting market conditions,
the auction system has been replaced by the ‘stop-off-rate’ (SOR) system. In the latter, the
quantity is set by Bank Indonesia and market forces are allowed to determine SBI rates. In the
early years, the market for SBIs was very thin and most SBI outstanding was held by state
banks. As a result, the authority found difficulty in controlling the liquidity of the economy
using the instruments indirectly.10 The volume of SBIs is now large enough to enable the central
bank to utilize them to conduct open market operation more effectively.
In the course of the 1998-financial deregulation the reserve requirement was reduced from
15% to 2%. This indirect instrument of monetary control was not employed again until December
1995 when the requirement was increased to 3%. Recently, September 1996, Bank Indonesia
announced that the ratio would be increased to 5% effective on 16 April 1997. In contrast with
previous reserve requirements, the last two provisions are more restrictive in the sense that all
fund components in the bank liabilities are subject to the reserve requirement, including demand
deposits, time deposits, saving deposits and other liabilities, irrespective of the term of maturity.
In the old provision, the latter component included only liabilities with a maturity of less than 24
months. The re-utilization of the reserve requirement as an indirect instrument of monetary policy
is intended to control bank credit in the light of the surge in capital inflows explicitly reported in
the Bank Indonesia Annual Report: ’...minimum reserve ...can be applied to curb the growth of
money supply (M2), particularly bank credit’ (Bank Indonesia, 1996, p. 18). In addition, the new
provision will strengthen the power of monetary policy to influence the banks’ balance sheets.
Another recent bank regulation which is relevant to this discussion is the new imposition
of CAR to the foreign-exchange banks. To enhance bank prudence in expanding lending activities
and increase competitiveness, Bank Indonesia required foreign-exchange banks11 to increase their
CAR in phases up to 12% within six years from September 1995. This regulation is also aimed
at controlling the expansion of bank credit that has resulted recently from large capital inflows.

III. Methodological Issues
1 0 For example, in September 1984, the interbank overnight rate reached 90% per annum when the economy
experienced a liquidity squeeze. On other occasions to counteract speculation about changes in the foreign-exchange
rate in the second quarter of 1987, the authorities took drastic measures to force the reduction in bank reserves by
requiring state banks to purchase SPBUs and instructing state enterprises to use their deposits to buy SBIs. A
similar case occurred in early 1991. These massive transfers of funds from state-owned banks to the central bank
are known as the “Sumarlin Shock” (after the former Minister of Finance who instructed them).
11 Foreign-exchange banks are defined as domestic and foreign banks that are licensed to engage in foreign exchange
transactions.
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III.1. Aggregate vs Disaggregate Data.
Most earlier studies on the bank lending channel have been conducted by the use of
aggregate data comparing the relationship between total bank loans versus the total deposits
and the economic variables in the context of vector auto-regression (see Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) and Callen and Reynolds (1996) for Thai and Malaysian economies) or the relative
forecasting power of the two aggregates with respect to output fluctuations (Ramey (1993))
among others). However, it is now widely agreed that testing with aggregate data can generate
a misleading conclusion. First, the use of aggregate time series can not resolve the well known
identification problem. i.e. to distinguish whether the credit contraction which typically follows
the monetary tightening is a result of the supply by banks, as argued by the bank lending
channel, or the fall in demand for bank loans stemming from a recession. Second, testing the
relative importance of the bank lending vs money view by comparing the information content
of these two aggregates with respect to output would be misleading (Bernanke, 1993). Because
of bank balance sheet constraints, aggregate money supply (liability side of banks) and
aggregate bank loans (asset side of banks) by construction, move together although they are
not identical. Thus, the relative forecasting power of these two aggregate variables does not
provide any information about monetary transmissions.
To identify the channel of monetary policy, recent studies (Kashyap and stein, 1995,
1997; dale and Haldane, 1994, for example) have tended to use cross chapteral data to
determine whether there are distributional effects of monetary policy across lenders and
borrowers, as predicted by the bank-lending-channel argument. On the lenders’ side, the
argument of lending view suggests that monetary policy shock should constrain bank loan
supply since banks can not frictionlessly raise non-deposit funds to make up for a shortfall in
their deposits. But this will depend on the ability of banks to insulate themselves from the
shock. Small banks which have relatively limited access to non-deposit funds such as securities
issues or foreign borrowing are expected to be more affected by the monetary shock and tend
to cut their loans supplies immediately following the shock. On the borrower side, small firms
which have limited access to external finance should be more sensitive to monetary shock
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). The use of cross chapteral data, furthermore, eliminates the banks’
balance sheet constrains.
This study follows Kashyap and Stein (1995) by disaggregating banks into different
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Figure 1
Number of Bank in Sample

classes, reflecting their size and accessibility to non-deposit funds: state banks which are large
and foreign-exchange-licensed banks, private forex licensed banks comprising domestic and
foreign/joint banks, and private non-forex licensed banks. We aggregate balance-sheet items
from bank-level data taken from Commercial Bank Monthly Report collected by Bank Indonesia
for regulatory purposes and monetary statistic.12 By using these data, we can maintain data
consistency because since 1992 Bank Indonesia has not published aggregate bank balance
sheet data of private forex vs non-forex licensed banks.
We identify all private domestic banks which change their status from a non-forex bank
to a forex bank in any two adjacent months and classify them according to their categories.
Furthermore, using the bank-level data we were able to identify merger banks and collapsed
banks during the sample period of sample and eliminate them. New banks which were
established after 1991 were also eliminated since their loan behavior would be biased because
of their high liquidity in the early period of operation. For example, the average loans-todeposits ratio of new banks one year after establishment amounted to 0.53, while that for old

12
Disaggregated data into different classes are available to the aouthor, but due to banking secrecy, data on
bank-level are confidental.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2000

9

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 3, No. 1 [2000], Art. 2

130

Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 2000

banks amounted to 0.95. Figure 1 presents the number of sample banks in each category over
the sample period January 1983 to December 1995.
The data for each class of banks include bank loans, deposits, non-de-posit funds and
securities holdings. Bank loans consist of loans extended in domestic and foreign currency,
The loans are also disaggregated into investment, working capital and consumer loans.
Securities consist of all securities held by banks both in domestic and foreign currency. Nondeposit funds consist of securities issues, CDs, commercial paper in domestic and foreign
currency and direct foreign borrowings. Appendix 1 gives the sources and definitions of data.

III.2. Vector Autoregression Approach
The effects of monetary policy shock on bank balance sheets and economic variables
are examined using the vector autoregression (VAR) approach. Specifically, we use the
standard semi-structural VAR approach as suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). A
VAR is a useful model for studying the dynamics of the economy in the aftermath of a monetary
policy shock. A structural VAR model is a linear dynamic system of the following form:
Byt = C(L)yt + εt............................................................... (1)
or in MA form:
yt=Φ(L) εt........................................................................... (2)
where Φ(L)=[B-C(L)]-1.y is an n x 1 vector of endogenous variables in the system
including one policy variable and some non-policy variables εt is a vector of structural shocks,
including the monetary policy shock. B represents the structural parameters of
contemporaneous endogenous variables and C(L) is a kth degree matrix polynomial the lag
operator, i.e. C(L) = C1L + C2L2 +...+CkLk. εtis an n x 1 vector of structural shocks with zero
mean, orthogonal and variance-covariance matrix E(εtεt’) = I.
Equation (1) can be written in a reduced form which can be estimated by OLS as:
yt = A(L)yt + ut ................................................................. (3)

With E(utut’) = Ω. By noting A(0) = B-1, from the structural model (1) and the reduced
form model (2) we obtain :
A(L) = A(0)C(L) ............................................................... (4)
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and,
ut = A(0)εt .......................................................................... (5)
Accordingly,
E(utut’) = Ω = A = (0)A(0)t ........................................... (6)
From (2) we can obtain impulse-response functions, Φ(L), to structural shocks,εt and Φ(L)
can be calculated from (3) and (5) :
Φ(L) = [I-A(L)]-1 A(0) ....................................................... (7)
In order to identify the structural model and structural shock, εt we have to determine

the n x n elements of matrix A(0). As Ω is known from OLS estimates of (3) we can solve (6) for
A(0) and the deduce εt from (5). However system (6) only provides n(n+1)/2, hence we need
n(n-1)/2 additional restrictions for the identification. A convenient way is to add the n(n-1)/
2 restrictions A(0) on lower triangular and use the Cholesky decomposition of the variancecovariance matrix Ω (Sims, 1980). This restriction is equivalent to assuming that the residuals
ut form a recursive system. The ordering of variables in the system, therefore, affects the
recursive chain of causality among the shocks in any given period. The policy variable is
placed first (for example, Sims, 1992) if we assume that there is no contemporaneous feedback
from non policy variables onto the policy variables. Thus, this equivalently assumes that the
monetary decisions are made without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic
variables. This assumption is plausible if data for non-policy variables are not readily
available. If we assume that the policy variable responds to contemporaneous feedback from
non policy variables but there is a one-period lag of feedback of the policy shock on non
policy variables, the policy variable should be placed at the end. Given the high frequency
data (monthly) that we use in constructing VARs, hence the existence of information lag from
non-policy variables,13 we prefer identifying restriction. Nevertheless, as the correlations across
residuals (εt) are very small, the ordering is actually not significant.14

III.3. VAR Specification
In examining the effects of monetary policy on the bank balance sheet, one ideally should
include all bank balance sheet components in a VAR, so that the interrelationship between

1 3 For example, interest rate date data (the policy variable) is readily available, while non policy variable such as real
output, and price were available at lag.
1 4 A rule of thumb is that if [pif] for i = j, the ordering of variables in a VAR is not relevant.
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the balance sheet components can be evaluated (McMillin, 1996). However, such a
specification, which may involve a VAR with many variables, needs a very long sample series.
Given the rather limited sample period that we have, we follow Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)
and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in specifying the VAR. In the VAR, each balance sheet variable
is entered separately in the model. The systems we developed are five-variable VARs with the
following ordering: monetary policy indicator, exchange rate, balance sheet variables (deposits,
loans and securities), output and prices. Given that the calculated residual correlation of the
VARs was very low (not calculated here due to space), the impulse response functions were
not sensitive to the ordering (see Enders, 1995).
As far as the monetary indicator is concerned, literature on the identification of monetary
shock suggest that there are some alternatives: the interest rate used by the central bank to
influence the money market such as the Federal Funds rate in US - an endogenous interbank
rate (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992), Romers’s dates of monetary tightness (Romer and Romer,
1990), or some aggregates such as total reserve, non-borrowed reserve, (Strongin, 1995;
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996). In the case of Indonesia, interest rates of Bank
Indonesia certificates (SBI) could be considered the best indicator of monetary policy change.
The SBI interest rates are based on a cut-off rate (stop-off rate since 1993) determined by the
monetary authority, and they are utilized by the central bank to influence the money market
interest rates. Hence, they are an ideal candidate for the policy variable. However, as the
market for SBI was very thin especially in the early periods and the interest rates on SBI for a
certain maturity were interrupted, we use the one-month interbank interest rates, instead, as
an indicator of the stance of monetary policy. The reason is that bank Indonesia often indirectly
targets the interbank interest rates and in recent years, the SBI rates have been widely used as
the benchmark by market (Bank Indonesia, 1992).15
In addition to output measured by real GDP and the prices measured by the consumer
index, we incorporate the exchange rate in the VAR. This variable is neglected by many studies
such as Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) and this would be justified
for a relatively closed economy like the United States. However, for relatively small and open
economies like Indonesia, the exchange rate plays an important role. Innovations in exchange
rate affect the economy significantly. The VAR is specified in the following order: interest
rates, exchange rate, balance sheet variables, real GDP and consumer price index.

15

Callen and Reynolds (1996) also use money market interest rates in studying the transmission mechanism in
Malaysia.
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All variables are in log levels16 and were tested for stationarity by Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. All were found to be I(1) with exception of the
money market interest rates.17 Sims (1980) and Doan (1992) do not recommend differencing
the data prior to VAR estimation even if they contain unit roots. Their argument is that
differencing in order to assure stationarity will “throw away” valuable information concerning
the interrelationships of the variables in the system such as the possibility of a cointegrating
relationship. It should be noted that the emphasis of VAR analysis is on tracing the dynamic
relationships among a set of interested variables, not the parameter estimates. Therefore, the
VARs were estimated with all variables in log levels. This specification is equivalent to an
unrestricted vector error correction mechanism (Dale and Haldane, 1994). The lag length on
the VAR is determined by the use of Akaike information criterion and misspecification tests
such as auto-correlation and normality tests, and it is found that six lags is optimal.

IV. Empirical Results
The aim of this section is to examine the behavior of the bank balance sheet across bank
categories and to see whether or not the differential responses to monetary policy shock are in
line with those predicted by the bank-lending view of monetary transmission. There are three
bank balance sheet items which are considered to have implications for the bank lending
channel view: deposits, loans and securities holdings. The sample period of our study
(1983:01-1995:12) covers several structural changes in the financial structure of banks and
firms and the operation of the monetary policy as a result of the process of financial
deregulation, which was adopted by the government in June 1983 and October 1988 (PAKTO),
the “big bang” of Indonesian financial deregulation. These structural changes raise the
question of the stability of the VARs. Ideally, the sample should be split into two periods,
before and after the PAKTO, and the VAR and impulse response functions estimated for the
two periods. However, the sample split will result in such small samples that the observation
would not be sufficient to estimate VARs. Therefore, we test the stability of the VAR by the
Chow-breakpoint test.18 The Chow test for all VARs indicate that there is no sign of instability

16

Interest rates are in the form of 100 log(1 + r/100).

17

Available upon request.

18

This is performed by PCfilm version 8.0 (Doornik and Hendry, 1995). The Chow-test results are available upon
request.
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Figure 2
Response of Bank Deposits to a Monetary Shock

in the VARs.
The bank lending view, like other channels, predicts that a monetary contraction leads
to a fall in bank deposit as a result of fall in bank reserves. However, the bank lending view
does not predict differential effects of bank deposits across bank sizes. Specifically, the view
does not predict that small banks’ deposits will fall more than those of large banks (Kashyap
and Stein, 1995). To test this prediction, we constructed a five-variable VAR including deposits
as the balance sheet variable and examined the impulse response function of bank deposits
in the aftermath of monetary shock. The bank deposits consist of demand deposits, time
deposits and saving deposits in both domestic and foreign currency. All types of bank deposits
are subject to homogenous reserve requirements. The impulse-response function over time is
presented in Figure 2, demonstrating the timing and magnitude of the bank deposit responses.
The result suggest that deposits of all categories of banks fall sharply following a monetary
contraction. The initial impact of a monetary shock is an increase in deposits with state and
foreign-exchange banks, which could be attributable to a “flight to quality” in response to a

19

“Flight to quality” early occurred in the recent currency crisis when depositors moved their deposits to state
banks or foreign banks.
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Figure 3
Response of Total Lending Volume to a Monetary Shock

monetary shock.19

The next and the most crucial investigation on banks’ balance sheet behavior is to
examine the response of loans across heterogenous banks to a monetary tightening. Figure 3
demonstrates the impulse-response functions of bank loans to the shock. Total loans of state
banks are insensitive to monetary shock. It can also be noticed that lending by state banks
and forex banks increased in the early period after monetary shock. This behavior is supported
by a survey conducted by Hadad (1996). He found that during the tight money period, the
majority of state banks and foreign banks experienced “loan growth higher than deposit
growth”. This could possibly be due to their access to foreign sources of funds or interbank
transactions. Figure 3 also suggest that the total loans of non-state bank decline more than
those of state banks after the shock. Moreover, the fall in total loans of non-forex banks was
quicker and much larger than that of forex banks. Overall, these results confirm our prediction
that because of asymmetric information, it is difficult for small banks to raise external finance
by issuing non-deposit funds or borrowing abroad to replace the fall in their deposits to
continue their lending activities. These results are also consistent with a model of the banks’
portfolio response to monetary policy shock developed by Kashyap and Stein (1995) which
predicts that total loans of small banks decline more rapidly in response to the shock.
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The differential behavior of total loans across bank categories may be explained by an
alternative interpretation (see, for example, Kashyap and Stein, 1995). The differential
responses could be generated by different types of loan advanced by different categories of
banks; large banks tend to concentrate on investment loans while small banks tend to
concentrate on consumer loans such as housing loans. Since consumer loans are relatively
more sensitive to monetary contraction/recession than investment loans, the differential effects
of monetary policy on banks could be caused by loan demand of different types of loans, rather
than by loan supply. Therefore, to address this possibility, we disaggregate the total loans into
investment loans, working capital loan and consumer loans for all categories of banks. The
impulse-response functions of the different types of loan are presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
The general pattern of the results is consistent with total loan response: all types of loans of
small banks fall more than large banks. Furthermore, we can notice that investment loans by
state banks increase somewhat over the horizon (Figure 4). This also applies to the state banks’
working capital loans (Figure 5); the type of loans does not decline at all when the policy is
tightened. As far as forex and non-forex banks’ loans are concerned, all types of loans are
sensitive to monetary shock and the non-forex banks’ loans decline more sharply than those
of corresponding forex banks, except for investment loans. Again, these result are consistent
with our prediction that smaller banks (non-forex) suffer from monetary shock more than
larger (forex) banks.
Figure 4.
Response of Investment Loans to a Monetary Shock
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Figure 5.
Response of working capital Loans to A Monetary shock

Interestingly, figure 6 indicates that consumer loans for all bank categories, including
state banks, decline significantly in the aftermath of monetary policy shock. This is an
important point. While investment and working capital loans of state banks do not fall but
Figure 6
Response of Consumer Loans to a Monetary Shock
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show a significant increase, their consumer loans fall significantly. Given that consumer loans
can be attributed to small borrowers, this result supports the view that this class of borrower
is most affected by a monetary policy shock. So far we can conclude that a monetary policy
shock generates a distributive effect across both lenders/banks borrowers as predicted by the
bank lending channel or generally by another channel which emphasizes the role of
asymmetric information in transmission of monetary policy.
In the Indonesian economy, the sluggish responses of investment loans and working
capital loans extended by state banks and some domestic forex banks to monetary shock can
be attributed to the relationship between the banks and big business groups. As noted by
Nasution (1994, p.134): ’...These group of companies enjoy concessionary loans from the state
banks... It can be noted that most private banks are closely connected to these same large
business conglomerates through ownership networks and interlocking management.........’
Harris et al. (1995) and Nasution (1994) confirm that Indonesian firms associated with
conglomerates generally have very high debt-equity ratios. The relationship between banks,
financial intermediaries and business groups helps to some extent to reduce information
problems, lower the wedge between cost of external and internal funds, and hence improve
their access to external finance. In a more recent study on the corporate structure of large
firms listed in the stock market, Ang et al. (1997) found that from both survey and econometric
results, there was no evidence of asymmetric problems in the firm-bank relationship in
Indonesia. Hence, they conclude that ‘...for larger firms that have long operating histories
and thus built up relationships and reputations with their banks and the credit market,
asymmetric information diminishes’. Furthermore, from the survey results, they found that
large firms manage to negotiate the lending rates and covenants and most of the firms surveyed
managed to obtain favourable rates from their banks. The most important finding by Ang et
al. (1997) which is quite relevant to our results is that the firms believe that even in periods of
tight money, their banks still favour them, resulting in their bank loans being relatively
insensitive to a monetary policy change. A survey by Hadad (1996) also confirms that in a
period of tight money, Indonesian banks, particularly state banks and foreign banks, tend to
prioritize their prime debtor instead of limiting loan expansion.
In other countries, such as Japan and Korea, groups are organically linked with banks.
Banks provide a large proportion of financing for business groups (Keiretsu) and sit on the
board of directors of the groups. A study by Hoshi et al. (1991) finds that firms that are members
of Keiretsu are less sensitive to cash flow than are those unconnected with the business groups.
However, in contrast to Japanese Keiretsu, as noted above Indonesian private banks are mostly
owned by large business groups. Hence, rather than providing a monitoring role, the banks,
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Figure 7
Response of Securities Holdings to a Monetary Shock.

in practice, become the fund-raisers of the groups. In these circumstances, evidence that there
is “no asymmetric problem” in the Indonesian bank-company relationship as found by Ang
et al. (1997) should be not too surprising.
An alternative interpretation of the results is possible. Bank lending practices in
Indonesia, especially by large banks, are mostly conducted on a loan commitment basis, in
stead of on a project or fixed-term basis. Under such a commitment, banks allow borrowers to
draw down a line of credit at their discretion; and borrowers pay a fee for the credit line and
pay interest on actual loans that have been drawn. As a result of this system, banks can not
prevent the borrowers from drawing the credit even when monetary conditions are tightened.20
Furthermore, the loan commitment practice often leads to “evergreen” loans which result in
banks facing the problem of having to increase the credit line.21 Bank are sometimes forced to
increase credit lines when they reach their upper limits in order to save the borrowers from
financial difficulties, otherwise they have to increase their capital position to cover nonperforming loans of the borrower and face financial difficulties in meeting the capital adequacy
20

In the system, banks in most cases cannot compel the borrowers not to use the credit line to pay the interest
rates actual loans.

21

See Cole and Slade (1996, pp. 120-121) for a detail discussion of this.

22

This is also exacerbated by the fact that the decision process in state banks was heavily infuenced by political
considerations, as suggested by some cases such as loans to the Timor national car project (Linbad, 1997).
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requirement. These circumstance create a moral hazard problem for the borrower as the banks
implicitly “guarantee” not to force the firms into trouble.22 Accordingly, it is not surprising
that the investment loans and working capital loans of state banks are completely insensitive
to monetary tightening.
This is confirmed by the decrease in the securities holding to finance the loan supply in
the period of tight money (Figure 7). Holdings of securities by state banks and forex banks
drop quickly after the shock. By contrast, non-forex banks increase their securities holdings
throughout the horizon. The intuitive explanation of this result is that since small banks face
difficulties in seeking
External finance in the aftermath of monetary shock, they tend to be less willing to
drop their securities. By contrast, state/large banks which are more confident in raising
external funds (foreign borrowing, for example) liquidate their securities after monetary
tightening. The liquidation of their securities holdings could be used to maintain their credit
commitment to the ‘high quality’ bank customers. This argument is supported by the fact that
the decline in state bank deposits coincides with the decline in their securities holdings (see
Figure 2 and 7).
There are two implications of the loan commitment for the bank-lending channel of
monetary policy. First, it supports the distributional effect of monetary shock across firms as
predicted by bank lending. Firms with loan commitment agreements can access bank loans
even when money is tight. The firms increase their borrowing to smooth the effect of declining
cash flows as a consequence of monetary tightening. On the other hand, firms without loan
commitment have to face credit rationing. Second, if a credit channel exists, the loan
commitment may tend to lengthen monetary policy lags, since firm can borrow under a
commitmrnt and delay the impact of a monetary contraction.

V. Conclusions
The study has investigated empirically whether there are differential effects of monetary
policy on banks’ balance sheets across bank categories (state banks, forex banks and nonforex banks) particularly in relation to their deposits, loans and securities and the implications
for the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in Indonesia, especially after
financial deregulation in the early 1980s. We find significant different responses across the
bank-size classes to a change in monetary policy. In particular, a monetary contraction does
not significantly influence lending by state banks, but it leads to a decline in lending by smaller
banks. A similar pattern emerges when loans are disaggregated into investment and working
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capital loans. However, consumer loans of all bank categories drop substantially after the
monetary tightening. Thus, the empirical results provide evidence of capital market
imperfections for banks.
The results indicate that monetary policy has been unable to restrain lending by the
state banks because of thir ability to liquidate their securities following a monetary tightening,
and possibly also because of their access to non-deposit funds including foreign borrowing.
The sluggish behavior of state bank loans can be attributed to their strong relationship with
large business groups, as found by Ang et al. (1997) and also due to loan commitments. In
other words, the second condition for the existence of the bank lending channel is undermined.
By contrast, the fact that bank lending by smaller banks has been easily constrained by
monetary policy provides evidence that the bank lending channel of monetary policy operates
through this class of banks. We also found that working capital and consumer loans decline
more significantly and quickly than investment loans in the class of non-state banks,
suggesting that small loans and loans not made under loan commitment tend to be more
restrained by monetary policy. The asymmetric effects of monetary policy across both lenders
and borrowers support the bank lending view of the monetary transmission mechanism in
the Indonesian economy. Despite the strong evidence in favour of the bank lending view,
further research on differential behavior across non-financial firms’ balance sheets, in response
to a monetary shock could provide further confirmation for the findings.

Appendix Data: Sources and Construction
Data are monthly from January 1983 to December 1995.

1. Macroeconomic Data
Money market interest rate is the end-of-period 1-month interbank call money rates
published in Weekly report of Bank Indonesia.
Exchange rate is the end-of-period middle rates of Rp/USD at Bank Indonesia as
published in Indonesian Financial Statistic-Bank Indonesia
Real GDP: monthly data of the real GDP is interpolated from quarterly real GDP
published in Indonesian Financial statistics, Bank Indonesia. The interpolation was performed
by the piece-wise cubic spline method. For early periods when the quarterly data were not
published officially, the data were obtained directly from Indonesian Central Bureau of
statistics.
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Prices: consumer price index published in Indonesian Financial Statistics-Bank
Indonesia.

2. Banks’ Balance Sheet Data
Banks’ balance sheet data are aggregated from individual bank balance sheets reported
by commercial banks to Bank Indonesia. Detailed definitions of each item of the balance sheet
are given in Manual for Monthly Report of Commercial Banks in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia,
1995).
Deposits consist of demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits in both Rupiah
and foreign currency, excluded certificate deposits.
Total loans are those extended by commercial banks in both Rupiah and foreign
currency.
Working capital loans are those extended for firms’ working capital in both Rupiah
and foreign currency.
Investment loans are those extended for firms’ investment in both Rupiah and foreign
currency.
Consumer loans are those extended for consumers such as real estate, automobile or by
credit cards.
Securities holdings consist of all securities held by banks in both Rupiah and foreign
currency.
Non-deposit funds consists of certificate deposits, securities issued in both Rupiah
and foreign currency and direct foreign borrowings.
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